لحظة ادراك

"Fattened Creations on the Tables of the Devious"

Yesterday evening, November 9, 2024, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement over 24 hours after Western, American, and Israeli media reported information claiming, “The State of Qatar informed those involved in the Israeli hostages and ceasefire negotiations in Gaza that it had withdrawn from these negotiations and notified Hamas of its intention to close its office in Qatar.”

The key word in this statement was describing the information as "inaccurate" rather than "incorrect." Why did the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs choose this wording? Can we rephrase what the Western and American media circulated to become entirely accurate from the perspective of the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as: “The State of Qatar informed those involved in the Israeli hostages and ceasefire negotiations in Gaza that it had suspended its participation in these negotiations and informed Hamas to be prepared for the potential closure of its representative office in Qatar after the failure of the partial exchange deal proposed by the Egyptians with American backing just days before the U.S. elections.”

The statement from the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflects the significant predicament Qatar finds itself in, evidenced by its delay of ten days before releasing any information regarding this move to the public prior to it being leaked by Americans and Israelis to the media, placing Qatar in this bind. This delay extended for another 24 hours before responding to these leaks. Here, it is essential to highlight several factors upon which many political and strategic analysts are basing their belief in the near decline or even disappearance of Qatar’s role in the broader Middle East peace process:

1. One of the first entities surprised by the events of October 7 was the State of Qatar. Western media portrayed it as being unaware of the happenings right under its nose, based on the fact that prominent members of Hamas’ political bureau, including its chief Ismail Haniyeh, were guests on its soil. It was unconvincing when the Qatari leadership conveyed to its American ally, and through it to the Israeli side shocked by the events, that what occurred on the morning of October 7 was the doing of Gaza and its leadership, spearheaded by Yahya Sinwar, who has Iranian leanings, and that those present in Qatar had no involvement. However, subsequent scenes, starting with Ismail Haniyeh’s celebratory prayer of thanks for the success of the October 7 attack, the numerous statements by political bureau members to capitalize on the attack’s initial success, and the open celebrations by Al Jazeera hosting movement figures and broadcasting their statements and footage from Gaza, made this narrative negligible. This was interpreted in international politics as a significant Qatari failure in the containment policy that was exclusively entrusted to it by the United States, with personal endorsement from Benjamin Netanyahu and tacit approval from successive Israeli governments.

2. It has become clear to Qatar and Hamas that the representative office in Doha will not remain for even one more day after the Israeli hostage crisis ends. The continuation of its presence is tied solely to the hostage issue, and Qatari efforts to link its sustainability to post-war outcomes are now seen as baseless. There is a near consensus among Israelis, Americans, Western nations generally, and even most influential Arab officials that the movement, which ignited this extensive destruction and chaos, will not be accepted in the Arab region again. Its continued presence signals more Iranian influence in the Arab region, with its catastrophic results evident to the majority of the Arab public.

3. Qatar is under direct Israeli accusation of not exerting enough pressure on Hamas to move forward with the hostage deal independently of the war’s cessation. The Americans share this view but with the condition of the war ending under improved terms for Israel due to their understanding of Qatar’s influence over Hamas through geographical pressure and presence. Qatar’s use of leaks as a preferred method to handle what takes place in actual meetings and American requests, to which Qatar responds with hints at suspending its participation, reflects its realization that it faces two painful choices. Since October 7, it has had no authority to decide whether to continue or suspend its participation.

4. Qatar knows full well that the hostage matter was managed by one individual in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, before his reported death as announced by the Israelis. The entire file has now transferred to his on-the-ground successor, his brother Mohammed. All political bureau members outside Gaza echo Yahya Sinwar’s previously set parameters, which Mohammed will not stray from even if they wanted to—logically, who in Hamas, whether in Gaza or elsewhere, would relinquish this critical leverage after all the devastation and casualties in Gaza and its complete re-occupation, just to respond to any pressure, even if the painful cost is being expelled from Qatar? The priority will undoubtedly be their presence in Gaza and the conflict equation as a whole.

5. The decision to open a Hamas representative office in Qatar and the extensive investments and direct or indirect Qatari support for Hamas in Gaza are now under review by the U.S., Israel, Qatar, and even some Arab states concerning the soundness of this idea. The strategy of containment and support alone, without any conducive political conditions, failed to convince anyone in Gaza, including Hamas supporters, that conditions were improving or solutions were being found for the region’s major and chronic problems compared to the previous period under the Palestinian Authority. This failure contributed directly to the events of October 7, resembling one fleeing from fire to flame.

6. Qatari bets on the stability of the U.S. political system and the continuation of the Democrats for another term, which would have allowed them to manage the crisis with clear political tools, have failed. These tools could have been accepted reluctantly under American pressure for calm in the Middle East and understanding of Qatar's limited capacity for change. However, such acceptance will not be granted by Donald Trump’s administration should he return to the White House. His approach to Qatar and its role in the region will be influenced by Netanyahu’s visions, which Qatar anticipates with great caution.

In conclusion, Qatar’s losses have been enormous after all this generous financial and political support and the employment of the most influential media arm in the Middle East by the Qatari leadership to benefit Hamas. This support transformed Hamas from a local Palestinian faction into a regional political force, perceived as an alternative to the PLO, only to be skillfully and deftly co-opted by Iran as a military arm serving its interests. Yet, in the first real test on the ground, it failed to meet the expectations of any party involved when major powers vied for influence and interests. This failure underscores a fundamental point: when a creation is fattened to meet others’ expectations, it will ultimately end up as a meal on the tables of the devious, perhaps to ward off imminent danger or renew credentials with a new power.