Before the dust settled from the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, Benjamin Netanyahu directed his far-right government to sound the drums of war on one of its seven fronts—a different kind of war: the annexation of the West Bank under Israeli sovereignty (the ultimate prize for Israel’s expansionist project following the catastrophic results of what was called the "Al-Aqsa Deluge").
Against the backdrop of the Arab-Islamic summit held in Riyadh on Monday, November 11, 2024, which issued a statement from 50 Arab and Islamic countries under the vision of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, emphasizing that the day after Israel’s wars should mark the establishment of a Palestinian state on the June 4, 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital to end the cycle of violence and death in the Middle East, Israeli Finance Minister and de facto Settlement Minister Bezalel Smotrich made a public statement to the world, declaring what Netanyahu had yet to say openly: "2025 will be the year of the West Bank's annexation to Israeli sovereignty."
These statements drew the usual condemnation from many world leaders, including Josep Borrell, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs, who pointed out that these remarks violate international resolutions. However, one might wonder if Borrell knew or if Smotrich even cared about these resolutions or had read any of their texts, which the civilized world touts.
In the wave of Israeli excitement over Donald Trump's return to the White House and his campaign statements that "Israel is a small country, and I am thinking of a way to expand it," analysts debated what Trump meant by "expansion"—whether it referred to parts of the Sinai Desert, the Jordan Valley, southern Lebanon, or further Syrian territories after granting Israel control of the Golan Heights during his first term. Or did he mean clearing out the West Bank and Gaza Strip of their native populations and settling Israelis in those areas, effectively expanding Israel's current size to encompass the full 27,000 square kilometers of historic Palestine?
Certainly, Smotrich's statements were not random nor personal party rhetoric; they were the result of urgent discussions within the Israeli government on how to maximize the opportunity of Trump’s likely second and final term in the White House, an Israeli government with two remaining years in power, and a supportive U.S. Congress before midterm elections. Missing this potentially once-in-a-lifetime chance was not an option.
Netanyahu dispatched Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, one of his closest confidants, to the U.S. to meet with both the outgoing and incoming administrations in about two months. The nature of the discussions would differ: with the outgoing administration, the focus would be on ending the war in southern Lebanon, securing an agreement with Lebanon that fulfills maximum Israeli demands on Hezbollah and the Lebanese state, and addressing ongoing operations in northern Gaza and Israel’s continuous need for time to neutralize threats in that region while facilitating the displacement of residents for Netanyahu’s undisclosed plans. With the new administration, Dermer’s mission would carry all of Netanyahu’s publicly stated and hidden agendas, as well as intentions already laid out by Netanyahu in three publicized calls with Trump.
International policies often replicate similar scenarios. Following Hillary Clinton's defeat by Donald Trump at the end of Barack Obama's presidency in 2016, Netanyahu had opposed the Iran nuclear deal and delivered a famous speech in Congress advocating against Obama’s policies and rallying support for Trump’s campaign. In response, Obama dealt a blow that Netanyahu still remembers by allowing a UN Security Council resolution to pass, designating settlements in the 1967-occupied territories as illegal. This resolution, while not changing on-the-ground realities, became a political and legal reference that depicted the settlements as unlawful, obliging states to adopt the same definition.
Would Biden's administration take similar action? Could it, in its remaining time, deliver a symbolic response to Netanyahu for undermining them and aiding in the loss of Kamala Harris’s presidential bid? Answering this involves considering two main factors:
- Biden, though Obama’s vice president, is not Obama himself and has shown weakness in standing up to Israel’s security needs, even when acknowledging their exaggeration for Netanyahu’s personal political gain.
- The political climate differs significantly from when Clinton lost to Trump; Israel is currently engaged in war following the October 7 events of last year, which exposed vulnerabilities and raised existential questions about its ability to endure. Supporting a two-state solution now may be seen as a reward for violence.
The decisive factor remains the strength of the Arab and Islamic position. Can Saudi Arabia, leading an international coalition advocating for the two-state solution, persuade Biden’s administration to take meaningful action before its term ends, possibly by tacitly supporting a UN resolution that elevates Palestinian representation to full member status? This would lay the foundation for a two-state solution and obstruct Israel’s annexation plans. Israel’s concerns about this are serious, as implied by Netanyahu’s support for Trump and the visits by Dermer and the Israeli president amid rising fears. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar alluded to these concerns, stating that the establishment of a Palestinian state is "unrealistic."
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