In
light of the dramatic collapse of Syrian army forces without substantial
fighting, armed groups have reached the outskirts of Homs after the fall of
Aleppo, Hama, and their surrounding rural areas. This was followed by similar
developments in Daraa, while battles currently rage in the Damascus countryside
near the administrative borders of the capital. Amid a feverish race between
military operations conducted by armed groups and some timid political attempts
here and there to contain the situation, several statements have been issued by
key actors in the conflict.
Among
the most notable was Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's clear remark that
the armed groups aim to reach Damascus. His statement was followed by Iranian
Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's acknowledgment that predicting the
fate of the Assad regime is now difficult. Similarly, the Qatari Prime Minister
announced that President Bashar al-Assad's regime had missed the opportunity to
find a political solution, warning of the risks of civil war, which require
efforts to prevent it.
These
statements reflect the shock experienced by both the armed groups and their
supporters, emboldening them to press forward toward Homs with their ultimate
goal set on Damascus. On the other hand, these developments surprised the
regime's allies, who began rearranging the positions of their advisors and
diplomatic missions, implicitly acknowledging that the collapse of the regime
is now one of the plausible scenarios.
The
most critical question arising from these rapid developments is: what are
the likely scenarios for the potential fall of the regime, and how will they be
perceived by the conflicting parties with their vested interests and influence
on Syrian soil?
This
question becomes particularly significant in light of statements made by the
most controversial figure in this chapter of the conflict: Abu Mohammad
al-Julani, the former affiliate of Al-Qaeda and current leader of Jabhat
al-Nusra, now rebranded as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is designated as
a terrorist group by numerous international powers, including the United
States. Julani's recent statements introduced a markedly different discourse
from the typical rhetoric of fundamentalist movements. He called for avoiding
revenge and emphasized that the future Syria belongs to all its components. He
also reassured working diplomatic missions of their safety, and notably, he
addressed the world under his real name, "Ahmad al-Sharaa," signaling
a clear break with his past. Adding to this was his interview with CNN, one of
the major American media outlets.
How
will all these messages be interpreted in light of the unfolding battlefield
dynamics, which can be summarized as follows:
The
Syrian Regime:
- The regime’s structure, under
no circumstances, will accept admitting defeat in the battle or sitting
directly at the negotiation table with the opposition in all its factions,
including armed ones. For the regime, this is an existential battle with
no room for compromise. It will prefer to retreat from one position to
another, even if it means withdrawing to its stronghold on the Syrian
coast or, if necessary, operating as a government in exile in one of the
few countries willing to provide such a shelter.
- During the meeting planned in
Doha today, the regime will likely attempt to negotiate a ceasefire and
demand that the armed groups withdraw at least from Homs and the outskirts
of Damascus. It may also propose accepting the loss of other regions
already beyond its control, paving the way for a political settlement
under the sponsorship of the three parties participating in the Doha
meeting (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). However, the pace of military
operations on the ground is likely to outstrip any resolutions or calls
for de-escalation issued by these parties.
The
Russian Federation:
- Russia is acutely aware that
the rapid collapse of the Syrian regime’s forces is both surprising and a
stark reality it had not anticipated. Given its strategic relationship
with the regime, Moscow will not be prepared to abandon it entirely and
will attempt to offer military support within its capacity, though it
understands that such efforts are unlikely to alter the situation on the
ground significantly. Simultaneously, Russia will strive to mitigate the
regime’s significant losses through a political settlement, which will
undoubtedly not favor the regime, all while keeping a close eye on
maintaining its foothold along the Syrian coast, which is now increasingly
vulnerable.
Turkey:
- Undoubtedly, Turkey, as the
dominant power controlling the threads of this conflict, is the only actor
capable of regulating its pace. Given the recent rapid and unexpected
collapses of regime forces, Ankara finds itself racing against time to
align the military progress of armed groups with a political narrative
that safeguards its interests. This is particularly crucial given the
complex and often contradictory web of international interests
intersecting in Syria.
Iran:
- Iran appears to have resigned
itself to the reality of the situation. Its ability to protect the regime
is now limited to minor political maneuvers that fail to match the
realities on the ground. Tehran’s calculations are now primarily focused
on the repercussions of losing Syria as a strategic ally and logistical
base for its most crucial regional proxy, Hezbollah, which has already
suffered significant losses in its recent war with Israel. Hezbollah now
requires more support than ever to recover from its setbacks. If Homs
falls, as expected within hours, the dramatic implications of the Syrian
regime’s collapse will undoubtedly impact Hezbollah as well.
Israel:
- Israel stands as the immediate
beneficiary of these developments. Without incurring any cost, it observes
the collapse of the Assad regime, which had opened Syria to its archrival,
Iran, turning the country into a logistical hub for Hezbollah and
Palestinian factions. However, Israel also views the prospect of replacing
Assad and Iran with Turkey and armed groups with suspicion. For Israel,
this exchange is akin to trading a known adversary for an unpredictable
one. Thus, Israel’s optimal scenario remains prolonged chaos and
fragmented control among rival factions.
The
United States:
- The United States, despite its
longstanding lack of intent to directly pursue regime change in Syria, is
unlikely to mourn Assad’s fall, sharing Israel’s strategic perspective.
However, Washington is particularly concerned with protecting its Kurdish
allies, who control significant territory in Syria and host key U.S.
military bases. While the Kurds had reached a tacit understanding with the
regime for peaceful coexistence, the recent developments raise the
question of whether the U.S. can establish similar arrangements with the
armed groups and their Turkish backers, given Turkey’s historic enmity
toward the Kurdish factions.
The
Arab World:
- The Arab League is the least
capable of influencing the unfolding events. The Syrian regime had pinned
its hopes on Iraq, both as a state and through its Iran-aligned militias,
for support. However, Iraq has firmly declined requests for assistance,
either as a state or through its armed factions. Consequently, the Arab
world watches the situation from afar, offering little more than feeble
political gestures that amount to mere window dressing.
Conclusion: The Lebanese war and Israeli strikes on Hezbollah and Iran
cannot be ignored as factors contributing to this moment. However, the key to
understanding the Syrian regime’s dramatic collapse lies in recognizing that it
governed a population that deeply desired its removal. When the opportunity arose,
many Syrians took up arms against it and quickly joined the ranks of the armed
groups. The Syrian army, hollow and devoid of the will to fight or defend its
positions, weapons, and territory, swiftly disbanded. Thus, the castles have
crumbled from within far more than due to external factors.
تعليقات
إرسال تعليق