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The Palestinian President, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Russian Roulette

The relationship between the late Yasser Arafat and the Muslim Brotherhood was rife with ambiguities. For a time during Gamal Abdel Nasser's era, Egyptian intelligence worked extensively on this file. It wasn’t until a series of meetings between the two late leaders that this issue was resolved. Arafat explained to Abdel Nasser—who was known for his stark opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood—that the great and untapped potential of the Brotherhood should be utilized in the Palestinian national struggle, including the armed wing. Abdel Nasser agreed but on the condition that Egyptian territories would not serve as a stage for such activities. Despite this understanding, Abdel Nasser frequently warned Arafat about the Brotherhood’s tendency to turn against their allies and potentially seize control of the Palestinian national movement, steering it into the complex web of broader Arab and Muslim causes.

The situation was less accommodating with the Syrian Ba'athist regime under Hafez al-Assad. When Syrian intelligence learned of growing ties between Fatah, its leader Yasser Arafat, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria—particularly the training of Brotherhood members at Fatah’s bases in Jordan, including figures like Abd al-Sattar al-Za’im from Hama—this marked the beginning of mounting tensions. Despite numerous meetings where Arafat clarified that these activities were limited to the Palestinian armed struggle and not aimed at Syria’s internal affairs, distrust lingered. This prompted Assad’s regime to unleash Palestinian leftist organizations to attack Arafat, accusing him of leading the Palestinian right wing, even within Fatah itself. This culminated in the 1983 split in Fatah, fueled by accusations that Arafat supported the events in Hama and Aleppo, which ended in massacres orchestrated by Assad's brother, Rifaat.

In his pragmatic approach of leveraging all available Palestinian and Arab resources, Arafat engaged in lengthy discussions with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, opening dialogue about their participation in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). He even offered them 40% of the seats in the Palestinian National Council, a move that angered many leaders within the PLO and Fatah. Arafat explained that even if he offered them half the seats, they would still reject joining under the PLO’s banner. His experience with the Brotherhood suggested they could not operate within a partnership framework. Their religious interpretation dictated exclusive authority for Muslims, further divided into two categories: Muslims by identity, who are excluded from partnerships, and Muslims by belief and practice, who are deemed acceptable but only if the organization is entirely under their control.

The aftermath of the Gulf War, coupled with unfavorable Palestinian, Arab, and international circumstances, led the PLO leadership to embrace the international push for a political resolution to the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This culminated in the Oslo Accords. The Muslim Brotherhood strongly opposed the agreement, labeling it a betrayal of fundamental Palestinian principles. Their response involved a dual strategy: political confrontation worldwide and escalating armed struggle within Palestinian territories. When the PLO leadership relocated to Palestine following Oslo, the Brotherhood boycotted the 1996 elections, claiming they were a byproduct of the accords.

From the outset, the Brotherhood confronted the PLO leadership with protests in streets and mosques, public incitement, and military operations against Israelis. These actions emboldened the Israeli right wing and reinforced their narrative about the dangers posed by the Oslo Accords, contributing to events such as Rabin’s assassination and Netanyahu's rise to power. The peace process became a series of steps forward and backward, with Palestinian jails filled with members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and leftist factions, as well as some rogue Fatah members. These individuals received direct support from Hezbollah and even Iran, leading to accusations against the PLO of failing to curb "terrorism" or even indirectly facilitating it. The failed final-status negotiations in Washington exacerbated the internal Palestinian crisis and set the stage for an imminent explosion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Ariel Sharon, the prominent figure of Israel's right wing, capitalized on the situation. He ignited tensions by provocatively entering Al-Aqsa Mosque with armed guards, sparking violent clashes between Palestinians—including Fatah and Islamic factions—and the Israeli military. The violence claimed thousands of lives on both sides, caused widespread destruction in the West Bank and Gaza, and culminated in the siege of Arafat. Arafat's death under mysterious circumstances, allegedly due to Israeli poisoning, ended the longest chapter of Palestinian struggle, while Sharon exited the political scene after dismantling Gaza settlements and falling into a coma.

Mahmoud Abbas assumed leadership amidst this chaotic landscape, inheriting fragmented authority, destroyed infrastructure, and internal disarray within the PLO and Fatah. Under international pressure, legislative elections were held, which Hamas decided to participate in after internal debates. While some within Hamas viewed the elections as a strategic opportunity to seize power, others opposed them on ideological grounds, maintaining the same objections raised in 1996. Pragmatism prevailed, and Hamas, capitalizing on Fatah's weakened state following Arafat’s death, emerged victorious. This outcome forced Abbas to accept the reality and hand over the Palestinian government to Hamas.

This shift complicated the Palestinian political scene further. International aid was halted, leaving Hamas with two choices: either comply with international conditions by recognizing the PLO's commitments or impose its authority through de facto control. Hamas chose the latter, restructuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to suit its agenda. Amidst halted salaries for predominantly Fatah-affiliated employees, tensions escalated into inevitable clashes. Efforts to form a national unity government failed, culminating in Hamas’s military takeover of Gaza, expelling the PA and inflicting heavy casualties, particularly among Fatah members.

The division of Palestinian territories became a stark reality. Despite numerous attempts at reconciliation, Hamas’s belief in its control over Gaza—bolstered by its civilian and military infrastructure, as well as external support facilitated by Qatar—enabled its survival for 17 years. This endurance was further reinforced by agreements with Netanyahu in exchange for maintaining calm in Gaza.

However, Hamas's confidence in its "excess strength" backfired following its military operations in what it called the "Al-Aqsa Flood." This escalated into an open-ended confrontation with Israel, leading to devastating consequences. Despite initial hopes that the capture of Israeli hostages would deter Israel, the conflict intensified, leaving Hamas grappling with diminishing leverage. As hostages dwindled in number, Israel showed no intention of allowing Hamas to govern Gaza again. Simultaneously, Hamas resisted Arab efforts to transfer authority in Gaza to the PA post-war.

Conclusion

1. The Palestinian President effectively engaged in a form of Russian roulette with Hamas by permitting their entry into Palestinian political life without establishing essential preconditions. This allowed Hamas to reject the political obligations accepted by the PLO upon assuming power.
2. Hamas, as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, inherently cannot accept a secondary role in Palestinian political life. Its interpretation of democratic participation is limited to scenarios where it emerges victorious; otherwise, it justifies rejection.
3. Hamas faces an ideological dilemma regarding the two-state solution and political compromises. While it occasionally shows verbal flexibility under pressure, it swiftly retreats from such positions to align with its base, often without hesitation.