لحظة ادراك

 

"Fools rush in where angels fear to tread"

When a unifying national state that encompasses all components of a society disappears, the dynamics of majority and minority begin to play out destructively. Along with them come the hymns of foreign interventions and the creeping visuals of civil wars with ethnic and sectarian dimensions and political entanglements. Once such wars erupt, they rapidly consume all the assets of a nation. Only after sinking deep into their mire can it be said that any concessions, had they been made earlier to prevent them, would have been cheap compared to the catastrophic consequences of slipping into such chaos. At that point, it is often said that the state or society has entered the club of failed states.

Undoubtedly, the core issue preventing Arabs from forming a united nation is the absence of a true national state in their respective countries—without embellishment or borrowed terms—rooted in legal systems based on majoritarian and minoritarian outlooks, or on the legitimacy of arms and those claiming credit for regime change. Before pointing fingers at foreign interference, it is more important to resolve internal contradictions. How can a Christian, Alawite, Kurd, Druze, or anyone else feel citizenship and that their rights are protected by law, when states are built with bureaucratic systems that reinforce these distinctions? And how can political Islam manage this diversity when its ideological foundations plant the seeds of contradiction and sow fear among minorities, promoting takfir (excommunication), questioning loyalties, and dividing people in advance?

This makes it the perfect recipe for civil wars in all their forms and consequences. No one has the right to seek foreign support to ignite such wars—as if sleeping next to a barrel of gunpowder and only launching an investigation after the explosion to find out who lit the match.

The Ba'athist Assad regime fell after more than 50 years in power due to international agreements following a brutal civil war and a power struggle that mixed politics with sectarianism for 14 years. Then, again through international agreements, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmad Al-Shara (a.k.a. Abu Mohammad al-Julani), an offshoot of political Islam, was empowered to rule Syria. Strangely, the world expects this entity to change its nature, believing that Al-Shara—once a member of Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra and now tied to major global intelligence agencies—is ready to step into the spotlight of international politics. But they fail to grasp that he and his small circle will not be able to bring about real change.

On the ground, there are armed groups raised for years on entrenched beliefs of hierarchical dominance, takfir, and disloyalty toward any dissenters. These groups, with their weapons, are like barrels of gunpowder spread across much of Syria. Their ideological upbringing will not allow for overnight transformation. The widespread footage from Sweida and earlier incidents on the Syrian coast—deeply degrading to human dignity—offer a glimpse of what lies ahead for Syrians.

The game of minorities has always enticed Israeli leaders—since its establishment 77 years ago, both domestically and abroad. From Lebanon to Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Africa, in most ethnic, sectarian, and political conflicts in these countries, Israeli intelligence (especially Mossad) has played a significant role, exploiting them in ways that often outperformed even global powers. While Israel didn’t create these conflicts, it certainly fed and used them for its own strategic benefit.

Now, Syria is its most dangerous theater. Fresh out of a 14-year civil war with destroyed infrastructure and a fragile security situation, Syria is caught in the hands of numerous international guarantors. Israel, under no circumstances, will allow Syria to become a strong, hostile state. Ideally, it wants Syria to be a stable state, but without a strong army—similar to Egypt or Jordan under peace treaties. Failing that, it prefers a failed state filled with internal strife where Israeli intelligence can operate freely. Even if this vision contradicts broader international interests, Israel has already imposed its own logic—for instance, bombing Syrian sovereignty symbols and preventing Syrian forces from entering Sweida. This forced other powers to compromise with Israel’s view by allowing limited Syrian state presence only as peacekeepers, nothing more.

Iran, freshly defeated in Syria, will not easily surrender control there to Israel or Turkey. It continues to destabilize the region through loyal forces to prevent the new Syrian regime from consolidating power in ways that contradict Iranian strategic interests—chief among them being the land corridor from Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Recent Alawite-Druze clashes bear clear Iranian fingerprints. Iran is working to fuel the current Druze conflict as well, given its local proxies’ resentment toward recent regime changes. Iran also faces the collapse of its regional influence, nuclear and missile programs being pushed back by years, and heavy losses to Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza. Syria remains its best option for regaining influence, given its fragile security landscape.

Turkey is fully entrenched in Syria and has led the charge in reshaping the country’s political landscape. Exploiting the Israeli-Iranian conflict and Syria’s proximity, it engineered international agreements to replace Bashar Al-Assad’s regime with a new, more pliable system aligned with Turkish and Arab interests, and acceptable to the West—especially the United States. Turkey and the U.S. even worked through key obstacles, particularly concerning the Kurdish file. However, Israel strongly opposed this arrangement, fearing that any regime emerging from political Islam could threaten its interests, despite outward reassurances.

Three primary agendas are now clashing in Syria—Israeli, Turkish, and Iranian—alongside several secondary regional and international ones. These agendas sometimes conflict strategically, but occasionally overlap. The new Syrian regime finds itself constantly embroiled in conflict—each time one front is quelled, another flares up. Following the Assad regime’s collapse, Syrian communities are now scrambling to assert their place in this chaotic transition, even if they don’t seek full separation from Damascus. They are determined to secure their identity and influence before new facts on the ground make further change impossible.

In Conclusion:

The image of Israel controlling the movement of the new Syrian regime’s forces in Sweida by force says it all. Israel is moving toward direct intervention under the pretense of protecting Syria’s Druze minority—an invitation made openly by a small Druze faction and tacitly accepted by broader segments. This could soon lead to other regional powers being invited in to protect their respective minorities.

Turkey’s active support for the new regime is evident, but the bigger question remains: Where are the Arabs in all of this? The current Arab backing for the new Syrian government is insufficient to safeguard Syria’s diverse society in the long run. Druze, Alawites, Kurds, and Christians are all integral Arab components of Syria—and the Arabs must not turn their backs on them.

What is truly needed is the dismantling of the current sectarian majority system, and the establishment of a pluralistic democratic state that guarantees full representation for all societal segments within Syria’s core institutions. Waiting for the majority to voluntarily grant justice is a delusion. A system that imagines governing a sprawling country through superficial internal regulations and selectively shaped conferences will only replicate the failures we already see.

The Lebanese model and its entrenched sectarianism should serve as a warning bell to anyone managing the Syrian file.