لحظة ادراك

 “An Ear of Clay and an Ear of Dough”

The origins of this old popular proverb have been told in conflicting stories. One tells of a girl who found a treasure that many before her had failed to obtain because of terrifying auditory hallucinations along the path to it. She managed to outwit these hallucinations by putting a piece of dough in one of her ears. When that wasn’t enough to block out all the sounds around her, she put a piece of clay in the other ear. This way, she was able to complete her mission successfully, unlike the others.

As with many things in Arab civilization and cultural heritage—where disagreements abound—another version attributes the proverb to a story of a young man helping his father apply layers of clay to the roof of their house in preparation for the stormy winter. Exhausted from his father’s endless requests, a lump of clay accidentally fell and blocked one of his ears, muffling his hearing. He liked the idea—less hearing meant fewer requests to carry out, without feeling guilty for disobeying. To complete the feeling, he secretly took some dough his mother had prepared for bread and stuffed it into his other ear, making himself completely deaf. This way, he felt no guilt and freed himself from the burden of carrying out tiring, immediate demands.

The moral of both tales—and of the metaphor this proverb represents in Arab culture—is that disconnecting from reality and closing one’s ears to what is happening around them can create a deceptive sense of peace. In personal life, this can sometimes be a useful escape, as the consequences are often limited to the individual and their immediate surroundings. But when such “deafness” is applied to public affairs that affect the lives of many, the results are completely different. Decision-makers who close their ears to society’s voices, under the pretext that such voices might weaken resolve or slow down their goals, are already doomed to fail. It’s like leading masses who are suspicious and doubtful of the chosen path—they will, consciously or unconsciously, work to obstruct it, no matter how noble the stated goals. These goals, once the subject of public consensus, become like a train dragging reluctant, skeptical carriages, unsure if the next station is really the intended destination where they can unload their burdens.

Following the breakdown of prisoner-exchange negotiations—which was entirely expected due to the sharp contrast between Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives and those of Hamas—Netanyahu sees the exchange as a temporary stop to recover half of the remaining captives, dead or alive, and then resume the war to achieve his goals. Hamas sees it as a step toward ending the war, withdrawing Israel from Gaza, and rebuilding the Strip, loading the negotiations with demands that make progress impossible.

Against this stalemate, on Thursday, August 7, the “mythical government” mini-cabinet carefully crafted a plan they called “full control over the Gaza Strip,” ordering the army to prepare operational plans while leaving the door slightly open for a prisoner exchange within two months—until the second anniversary of “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.” Carefully leaked reports from Netanyahu’s office spoke of disagreements between the military and political levels, just like past disputes over the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor. Netanyahu eventually ordered the invasion of Rafah, displaced one million Palestinians, and turned the city into ruins, now preparing it as a massive tent camp for the same number of people who lived there before.

On Sunday, August 10, Netanyahu held a press conference, reiterating five clear and direct points for ending the war in Gaza:

1. Disarming Hamas.

2. Freeing all Israeli captives, alive or dead.

3. Carving out a security buffer zone inside Gaza’s territory.

4. Maintaining security control over the Strip, including freedom of movement for Israeli forces.

5. Establishing an Arab civilian administration not affiliated with Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.

In other words, Hamas must accept these terms whether or not it agrees to a prisoner deal. Arabs who wish to take part in Gaza’s civilian administration must also know that returning the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza with Arab and international support is completely off the table.

Meanwhile, this hardline media campaign runs in parallel with a green light for U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein to pursue contacts for a partial or full deal—efforts Netanyahu knows will go nowhere. Before this press conference, far-right ministers openly questioned Netanyahu’s intentions: Bezalel Smotrich accused him of using threats merely to pressure Hamas into a deal, while Itamar Ben-Gvir demanded dismantling the Palestinian Authority altogether, citing leaks that Netanyahu might eventually accept its return to Gaza due to lack of alternatives.

All signs indicate the gap between Hamas and Netanyahu’s positions is widening as the war nears its end. Both Arab and international mediation efforts are hitting a wall: each side knows that in zero-sum wars like this, only one party emerges victorious, the other defeated. Both thus seek another bloody round in central Gaza and its refugee camps—Netanyahu betting on destroying Hamas’s last strongholds and imposing his terms by force, even at the cost of killing the remaining captives; Hamas betting on denying him victory, enduring massive losses, and keeping some captives alive to negotiate later, drawing on past experiences in Jabalia, Zeitoun, and Shujaiya.

But where are Gaza’s people in all this? The plan to forcibly displace them southward again remains on the table. Even if some still want to flee, can they? And if they choose to stay in the north under bombardment, what further price will they and their children pay after 22 months of relentless war?

Conclusion:

As we approach the second anniversary of this “war of myths”—which Netanyahu intended to use to finish off the Palestinian national project—what will we do? The cries of 2.5 million Palestinians have reached the heavens, yet the rulers of Gaza have not heard them. The only phrase heard from the majority of these suffering people is: “Stop the war”—nothing more, nothing less. Arabs and the Palestinian Authority have tried to give Hamas a ladder to climb down with minimal losses, but even these calls have gone unheard. Those nourished on the products of the Arab world’s “factories of illusions,” patented exclusively by the Muslim Brotherhood, believe in visions where the Prophet, who died over 1,400 years ago, leads prayers in Raba’a Square, or where Khalid ibn al-Walid commands armies there. The same mindset believes today that Khalil al-Hayya, Fathi Hammad, Mahmoud al-Zahhar, and others will lead the armies of the ummah to Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa.

What better gift could Netanyahu hope for? They’ve given him the opportunity of a lifetime to achieve far more than he dreamed of—and he will keep this mindset alive as long as possible, claiming to “fight” it. Their very existence is a threat to Israel, but also the guarantee of its control and occupation. Who can deny, after October 7, the narrative Netanyahu tells, reinforced by 18 years of preceding events? They’ve provided him the perfect excuse, and he has provided them with everything they need to survive. It is the ugliest form of mutual exploitation—and as long as this mindset prevails in Gaza, the worst is yet to come.