A Functionary State in the Anaconda’s Den
As soon as the roar of the Israeli missiles that struck Hamas’s headquarters in Doha reached the ears of its rulers, that state should have understood, first of all, that the first message carried by those rockets was that its previous functional role is now a thing of the past. The role assigned to it by the United States and Israel — and justified by both its old and new leadership — namely providing premises for Hamas to contain the situation emerging in the Gaza Strip after the 2007 coup on its soil as an explicit aim (and as an implicit substitute for the PLO), especially amid the Arab Spring during Obama’s tenure and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s era of empowering the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world (including Hamas among Palestinians), has failed to perform as intended. The sight of Hamas leaders celebrating the October 7 events on Qatari soil marked the start of the countdown for a failed US-Israeli marathon that achieved none of its stated or hidden goals. The time has come for change.
The Qatari leadership should have known that trying to play on two strings at once has become extremely difficult, if not impossible, and that hiding behind hostage-release negotiations — which were always limited in duration — would end sooner or later. The Americans and Israelis never hid this. No amount of political bribery in the trillions of dollars, nor a presidential “dream plane,” would do anything in the case of Donald Trump: he sees the U.S. protection he offers as an earned right, and has expressed that openly many times. If the Qataris misunderstood that, they must now reconsider decisively. A “functionary” state that only has money to offer, but lacks lobbying heft inside the corridors of U.S. decision-making, is as if thrown into the belly of a hungry anaconda. Confronting Israel on its own turf and in its own backyard is a recipe for catastrophic failure. Israel is itself a functional state financed by the United States as part of the American political and economic fabric; Jewish American lobbying, media and political money exert enormous control over U.S. public life, and only very few can paddle against that current. Access to decision-making centers runs through the privilege of funding expensive election campaigns — something no principled dissenter can usually afford, except in rare, exceptional moments.
The Qataris might delude themselves and some of their public into believing that Donald Trump was unaware of the strike, that he could not have adopted such an operation even if, as the White House spokeswoman put it, its stated objective was lofty. They might console themselves that a non-presidential press release — a document archiving that the Security Council’s statement did not name Israel explicitly — will be enough to restore and affirm their “functional” role after all these years and vast investments on behalf of U.S. and Israeli interests. But the one irrefutable truth is that this role has ended — period.
After the Security Council’s festival of speeches, the Qatari prime minister and foreign minister met with the U.S. vice president and secretary of state as a prelude to what they would hear directly from Donald Trump, who will reportedly insist that any continued presence of Hamas on Qatari soil is contingent on the resolution of the hostage crisis. Unconditional Hamas acceptance of Trump’s latest initiative is presented as the sole opportunity to allow Hamas leaders to remain there for a limited time; Trump would personally guarantee that Israel would not target them on Qatari territory — otherwise, no such guarantees exist and Israel might try again. Trump did not hide the objective: to target Hamas leadership on Qatari soil specifically. Nor was it any secret when he suggested that the operation might be an opportunity for peace and ending the war — echoing his earlier notion that the Iranian strike on Al-Udeid could have been an occasion to end the conflict with Iran.
No sooner had Marco Rubio finished his meeting with the Qatari prime minister than he hurried to Israel. Much of the agenda leaked to the press, but the dominant theme was the outcome of his meeting with Doha and what he would hear from Trump: a personal guarantee from Donald Trump that no Hamas leaders on Qatari soil would be targeted again — in exchange for sustained Qatari pressure on the hastily summoned Hamas delegation in Doha to accept Trump’s initiative unconditionally, and measures to stall the “Gideon 2” operations until that aim is achieved.
It was no accident that Steve Witkoff was substituted by Marco Rubio. Rubio does not hide positions that often align, in tone and spirit, with Benjamin Netanyahu’s — in fact, he frequently amplifies them in pursuit of his own future political ambitions. Rubio carries two very sensitive portfolios in Washington and is more than a mere messenger: he is capable of shaping policy with Netanyahu in the wake of the strike on Hamas’s headquarters. He will convey what the Qatari prime minister told him about the attack, so that remaining steps can be implemented and given the chance to succeed without disruption. Another key item on his busy itinerary is countering the diplomatic wave of recognition for a Palestinian state, coordinating Israeli-American steps regarding the West Bank and large-scale annexation, and reaffirming absolute support for the most reliable ally despite any differences.
Doha greatly overestimated itself and the favor it enjoyed under American patronage, to the point that it forgot that in America’s ledger of interests it is only a comma in a book filled with bitter precedents — a footnote amid many harsh lessons learned with prior actors who played this role. Doha invested huge money and effort during the Arab Spring, beyond its natural capacity as a small, oil-and-gas rich state. Despite repeated disappointments, each time it managed to extricate itself by pumping in more funds. But now it faces the most intractable test: Israel. This is a minefield with almost zero good options. If Qatar exerts maximal pressure on Hamas, it will lose the legacy it built for years supporting and sheltering it as a resistance movement. If it fails — and that failure is now on the line — it will revert to an ordinary Gulf state and be stripped of the prestige it accumulated over decades, under the shadow of the largest U.S. bases in the Middle East.
For a polity accustomed to that cachet, retreating to a secondary Gulf role and lining up behind Saudi Arabia and the UAE after having sparred with them — even placing its head against theirs — will be politically humiliating. The Bedouin mentality that chases fame and glory will likely push it to side with Donald Trump’s demands, even if doing so breaks its back as it seeks a way out of its predicament. Within the Arab world, Doha will now be forced to line up behind Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria — states that share borders and direct exposure to Israel — while those it once mocked and used as platforms for propaganda will eagerly await its fall from grace, despite the current chorus of support and ceremonial speeches.
There are no permanent friends or enemies — only permanent interests. That has been the rule of U.S. governance since its founding. Under Donald Trump, who recognizes only interests (and otherwise will consign the world, including America’s allies, to hell), where will Doha fit in Trump’s new calculus relative to NATO, the European Union, Canada, Mexico and others?
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