Once upon a time, long ago, in one of the Palestinian countryside villages, there was a farmer returning from his field with his donkey on a scorching summer day. When he reached the courtyard of his house, he went straight to the water tap and began filling water so that he and his donkey could quench their thirst. Once they had drunk their fill, he suddenly saw his donkey transform into a slender snake, slither into the opening of the water tap, and then peer out at him, its head emerging from the tap.
The next day, the exact same events occurred in every detail. Once again, people gathered, scolding him this time for not listening to advice and for returning to the fields. They urged him to rest for a longer period until he recovered.
After several days of decent rest, the same scene repeated itself. At that point, his relatives had no choice but to admit him to the moristan (a monastery used as an asylum for those with mental and psychological illnesses).
After three months there, the physician overseeing his case met with his family and informed them that he should be returned home, as it had been proven that he was fully sane, with no psychological or mental disorders whatsoever. His family brought him home, feasts were held to celebrate his recovery, and once the celebrations ended, our protagonist returned to work, brimming with confidence in his soundness of mind.
When he came back from work and the same scene unfolded yet again, and just as he was about to scream, he remembered everything he had endured. He addressed his donkey, peering out from the tap, saying:
“Come out, my friend. We are the only two who know that you entered the tap. But who would believe what I tell them? Still, we must think together about how to change the tap—no, the cursed place we live in—no, the very nature of our work—no, this town itself. For we have become an example to them: ‘a madman speaks, and a sane man listens.’”
This is the philosophy of our Palestinian tale. So do not be surprised by what you may hear in the coming days, in the Middle Eastern auction market, Trump-style. In the latest fashion, Khaled Mashal steps forward in an interview with the American website Drop Site News, calling on Donald Trump’s “serious administration” to grant Hamas an opportunity similar to the one given to Ahmad al-Sharaa—to open a serious dialogue with Hamas.
So what is the difference, he asks, between Ahmad al-Sharaa—an offshoot of al-Qaeda and al-Nusra, once wanted by the United States with millions of dollars on his head—who is now received at the White House, sprayed with perfume, and playing basketball with U.S. military leaders? We are ready, Mashal implies, and we lack none of his qualifications. We have a long-term truce with Israel in our pocket, are prepared to put our weapons in an American-made freezer, ensure unparalleled security in Gaza, and even participate in projects that serve regional security and stability, in line with U.S. policies.
What Khaled Mashal did not say explicitly to Donald Trump—but without the need to search for international stabilization forces, peace councils, disarmament, or dismantling systems—is that Hamas is ready to sit at the table and speak directly about everything related to Gaza and what comes after. What Ahmad al-Sharaa offered—curbing Iranian influence, participating forcefully in combating global terrorism, and establishing a sustainable calm with Israel—are all files open for negotiation and capable of delivering outcomes satisfactory to Donald Trump regarding Gaza.
This is our merchandise on offer. Do not reject it and drag yourselves into a new labyrinth. You know better than anyone that Hamas is the most capable at using the language of force to subdue its political rivals—it has done so before and can do so again. As for the Palestinian Authority and the PLO returning to Gaza, they will be unable to do anything without Hamas’s prior approval anyway. Why repeat an experiment that has already failed?
Hamas did not choose Khaled Mashal by chance to lead this narrative—with such frankness and clarity. He represents a current within Hamas that has its disputes with Iran and stands in contrast to the faction led by Yahya Sinwar. He also led a rupture with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2012, until Iran intervened and relations were restored under pressure from Sinwar’s camp.
As Hamas now stands at a historic crossroads, it found no one but Khaled Mashal to front this approach. Between a bitter option and a more bitter one, this proposal emerged—without a single voice within Hamas objecting—suggesting full coordination. This coincided with a visit by the Qatari-Turkish-Egyptian mediation delegation to the United States. It appears this offer is the Qatari-Turkish-Egyptian recipe they carried with them to Washington to break through and advance to the second phase of Donald Trump’s plan.
This approach now seems to be circulating within U.S. foreign policy corridors and Trump’s own calculations. Benjamin Netanyahu is not far from these discussions—though he categorically rejects them and goes further in opposing any Qatari or Turkish role or presence in Gaza. He knows full well that any Hamas presence in post-war Gaza means that the most important declared objectives of his war have not been achieved.
His upcoming visit to the United States is nothing more than an attempt to reorder the files with Donald Trump in line with Israel’s vision of the initiative and all its ramifications. Whether he succeeds in countering Arab and Islamic approaches remains to be seen, though all indicators so far favor him—chief among them the wording of the initiative itself, which leaves little room for interpretation.
Hamas and its leadership know that openly declaring acceptance of all commitments made by the PLO—including recognition of Israel—is the red line separating Hamas from its identity as a resistance movement and from its internal cohesion. They also know that the merchandise currently on offer will not be bought by the United States for more than a truce paper that merely prolongs the lifespan of Trump’s initiative.
So does the United States bet on more? Is Hamas capable of offering more at this moment? And is the current hesitation serving the Palestinian cause—or Hamas alone?
No one can imagine that Benjamin Netanyahu, his myth-driven government, or wide segments of Israeli parties and public opinion are ready to accept any settlement in which Hamas is present—even if it goes further than this. The PLO and the Palestinian Authority, despite all the commitments they have made, remain obstacles that Netanyahu places in the way of their return to Gaza. So what would the situation be with Hamas?
The memories left by the “Flood” still haunt Israeli consciousness, having triggered a radical shift in political discourse and a lurch toward the far right—not to mention the appetite it unleashed to permanently eliminate any form of a Palestinian national project. The Palestinian cause itself has now been pushed outside the realm of political discourse in Israel. As for the talk of reforms demanded of the Palestinian Authority, it is nothing more than media fodder marketed to Trump’s administration whenever pressure tightens.
We do not know whether Khaled Mashal realizes that Ahmad al-Sharaa was tested for years in partnership with the international coalition to dismantle Islamist organizations; or that without Saudi Arabia’s financial and political weight, al-Sharaa would not have reached where he is today; or that his rise to power in Damascus came through American-Russian-Turkish-Arab international understandings; or that the clear answers he provided to American concerns before assuming the presidency were enough to dispel all doubts about him.
So what does Khaled Mashal have to offer Donald Trump? Can he, for instance, condemn what Hamas committed on October 7? Is the “long-term truce” he markets even acceptable for inspection? And are the remaining fragments of weapons in his hands even viable as bargaining chips?
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