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 The Most Dangerous Wars Are the Ones That Are Not Fought

There is near-consensus among strategic experts worldwide that the most dangerous kinds of wars are those that are not fought at the right time. They are seen as a slow consumption of everything. States or international systems observe the threat standing plainly before their eyes, like a barrel of gunpowder, yet choose to ignore dealing with it under various pretexts—excuses of incapacity here or there, matters that will most likely never be openly acknowledged. And since politics, from the moment its rules were laid down, has never been a struggle of facts but rather a struggle of wills that impose their own definitions of truth—summed up in the phrase “the stick or the carrot”—the Iranian case stands as the most precise model of all the above.

War may break out, or it may not. The world stands waiting for a decision Donald Trump may take—or may postpone. The entire Middle East waits on a hot plate: fleets amass, mediators conduct calls to contain the blaze before it ignites. Analyses multiply; some may touch reality, others may miss it just as much. Between troop buildups meant to exert pressure and extract concessions, and other buildups that were not formed arbitrarily, there is on the opposing side a purely defiant Iranian discourse aimed at deterrence and warning, alongside another discourse open to all active mediations. In this sense, both sides move according to a simple equation: display force first; logic comes later—if it has any grammatical place at all—between the era of Donald Trump and the system of the Supreme Jurist.

Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018 during his first term, prompted and incited by Benjamin Netanyahu, despite the agreement having fulfilled the basic requirements of U.S. national security. Enrichment capped at no more than 3.67 percent under strict supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency was, at the time, regarded by the world as something easily tolerable. What differed for Benjamin Netanyahu, however, was Iran’s development of a missile arsenal capable of reaching all vital targets, as well as its support for all its arms and proxies encircling Israel like a bracelet around the wrist.

Now, after the massive changes that followed October 7—changes whose final outcome came decisively in Israel’s favor—what is the point of Benjamin Netanyahu pushing Donald Trump to deliver a crushing blow to Iran’s ruling system, if not that the very structure of the regime itself has become the target? Will U.S. calculations be the same as Israel’s? The simple answer is no—if those calculations are taken purely as matters of national security for both sides. But if the calculations go beyond that, toward an alignment between the vision of the conservative right in the United States and that of the ruling right in Israel, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, then the answer is an emphatic yes.

The United States and Israel bet on the protests that flooded the streets of Iranian cities. Yet the miscalculation—by the U.S., with Israel behind it—came when they openly and explicitly supported the course of these movements. This turned a regime already collapsing economically and incapable of providing a dignified life for its citizens into nothing more than an instrument of bloody repression that left thousands dead, under the pretext that the country was facing an external conspiracy—one that, it claimed, required little evidence. Donald Trump’s public statements about incoming support for the protesters, coupled with acts of arson and sabotage of public facilities carried out by a wide network of Israeli agents, produced a completely opposite reaction among broad segments of Iranian society. Many were forced to halt their protests, not because they had ever gone out to serve Donald Trump’s or Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives, but to demand dignified living conditions tied to their daily livelihoods and personal freedoms.

U.S. tendencies toward delivering a decisive strike against Iran clash with those of most countries in the region, which have become convinced that such a strike would directly benefit Israel as the sole dominant power in the region. This is unacceptable to states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as well. The disruption of the balance that would result would weaken their regional roles and compel acknowledgment of a new reality—one in which Israel overlooks the gateways of the world’s most important international maritime corridors. None of this would push Israel to become a “normal” state in the region, but rather a striking arm of power and influence. Its stance on Arab issues would not remain the same; its new position would drive it to impose its own vision and narrative, forcing others to submit to the new facts on the ground. If Somaliland is added to the geopolitical calculations, Arabs and Muslims, in precise terms, are left between two bitter choices: the hammer of Iran’s clerical regime—which has caused all these catastrophic outcomes for Arabs and Muslims on the one hand—and the anvil of Benjamin Netanyahu, dreaming of a new Middle East with no limits to that dream except a state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, if not geographically then politically and economically. Thus, the choice became preserving the status quo and coexisting with a weak regime as the lesser evil, rather than awaiting a new player with an insatiable appetite for expansion and domination.

In short, Donald Trump swallowed the sickle. After the impossible terms of submission dictated to him by Benjamin Netanyahu—terms he hurled at the Iranians—after moving his fleets in step with popular movements inside Iran, the expectation was that Iran would come submissively to the negotiating table, allowing him to extract a profitable deal; and if it did not, then limited, focused strikes would cause the regime to collapse like dominoes. But what happened was that before American mobilization was complete, the regime had already settled the internal unrest with all the force and brutality required. The only options left before the amassed fleets were either to strike with maximum force—along with the ensuing chaos inside Iran, something the United States had not calculated for without Marines in Iranian city streets—or to step aside and reopen space for dialogue, lowering expectations of its outcomes in advance. In doing so, the regime gained new breathing room to prolong negotiations indefinitely.

Thus, in the language of reality, Donald Trump became compelled to wage war—or else see his narrative erode with time, not only in the Middle East but across many open files worldwide—putting into practice the strategy that says: “The most dangerous wars are those that are not fought at the right time… because they consume everything slowly.”