In politics, as in boxing, some fights end on points, while others are pursued only to a knockout. In the first, both opponents leave the ring battered and wounded, yet still standing, each retaining the right to return for another round. In the second, one falls to the canvas, and with that fall both the match and the story come to an end.
That is how the confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other, increasingly appears today. In the eyes of Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, the issue is no longer fundamentally about uranium enrichment, the number of centrifuges, or even the range of ballistic missiles. Those are merely details within a much larger struggle. The real core of the conflict is the regime itself—the idea upon which the Islamic Republic was founded in 1979, and the vast network of influence it has built across the region over more than four decades.
For that reason, anyone who believes the current confrontation is merely an attempt to impose a new agreement on Iran, or to bring it back to the negotiating table under stricter conditions, is seeing only half the picture. In the political mindset that now dominates Washington and Tel Aviv, the issue has moved beyond the boundaries of conventional diplomacy. It has become an existential struggle aimed at reshaping the entire Middle East, not simply modifying the behavior of one of its players.
For many years, Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed essentially the same argument in countless forms and languages. He has viewed the Iranian challenge not merely as a military threat, but as a political and ideological project that endangers his vision for the region as a whole. When he stood before the United Nations holding diagrams and maps, he was never speaking only about a specific facility or reactor. He was speaking about an entire state that he wished to remove from the regional balance of power.
Donald Trump, who may appear to some as more pragmatic and less ideological, demonstrated throughout his political career that he does not approach major conflicts through the lens of partial compromises. When he withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018, he did not do so simply because he wanted a better deal. He believed the agreement had granted the Iranian regime additional time and space to survive. Since then, he has remained convinced that economic, military, and political pressure should continue to accumulate until it reaches a breaking point.
Within this context, the idea of toppling the Iranian regime no longer appears merely as an old Israeli aspiration. It increasingly resembles a strategic objective in which the thinking of the two leaders converges far more than it diverges. Despite occasional reports of tactical disagreements or stylistic differences, both appear to operate from a similar premise: a new Middle East cannot be built as long as the Islamic Republic, in its current form, remains a central actor within it.
Consequently, any political agreement that ultimately fails to undermine the regime or dismantle its capacity for regional influence would be viewed as a deferred defeat rather than a genuine victory.
From Netanyahu’s perspective, freezing or limiting the nuclear program would amount to winning on points in a fight he hoped to finish with a knockout. From Trump’s perspective, a new agreement could simply recreate the same problem a few years later, much as previous agreements allegedly did.
For precisely this reason, Iranian leaders understand that what they are facing is not merely another round of negotiations. They know that the debate is no longer centered on centrifuges, but on the future of the regime itself. They understand that their adversaries are not seeking to alter a handful of policies, but rather to replace the very authors of those policies.
It is the war that everyone fears and, at the same time, expects.
A conflict that extends far beyond Iran’s skies or the waters of the Gulf, reaching into Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza. A conflict in which geography intertwines with ideology, interests with doctrine, and economics with national security.
This is why Tehran appears more committed to survival today than perhaps at any point in recent memory. It views every major concession not as a step toward settlement, but as a step toward extinction. In its eyes, accepting the conditions demanded by its adversaries would not guarantee survival; it would merely accelerate collapse.
Herein lies the central paradox.
The greater the American and Israeli pressure becomes, the more convinced the Iranian leadership grows that the struggle is existential. And the more convinced Tehran becomes that the struggle is existential, the more difficult any political settlement becomes.
Thus, all sides enter a closed cycle of mutual escalation.
The United States and Israel view increased pressure as the only path toward achieving their objectives.
Iran views steadfast resistance as the only path to survival.
And between them stands the entire Middle East, balanced on the edge of possibility.
What is unfolding today recalls many of history’s great wars, moments when opposing sides reached a stage at which retreat became almost impossible. Moments when the question ceased to be, “How do we win?” and became instead, “How do we survive?”
That is the true danger of the present phase.
When war becomes a war of survival, every calculation changes. Potential losses become less significant than the fear of annihilation. Time itself becomes a source of pressure on all parties, not merely on one side.
Netanyahu understands that any end to the conflict that fails to neutralize Iran decisively would be presented within Israel as an incomplete victory. Trump understands that his vision of reshaping the region would lose much of its momentum if Tehran remains capable of rebuilding its influence a few years from now.
At the same time, Iran’s leadership understands that the fall of the regime would mean far more than a change of government or president. It would signify the end of a political project that has endured for more than four decades. For that reason, Tehran views the current confrontation as the defining struggle of its existence.
For all these reasons, the conflict appears to have moved beyond the stage of traditional bargaining.
It is no longer merely a contest over spheres of influence, but over the very definition of influence itself.
It is no longer a struggle over the balance of power, but over the identity of the power that will shape the next Middle East.
It is a confrontation between two competing projects, each with its own interpretation of history, its own vision of the future, and its own fear of defeat.
In such wars, the decisive factor is not simply the number of missiles or the size of armies, but the nature of the objectives themselves. Limited objectives can be negotiated. Existential objectives recognize only two outcomes: victory or defeat.
Conclusion
Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu appear to view the confrontation with Iran not as an effort to improve negotiating terms or modify political behavior, but as a historic opportunity to redraw the regional order and permanently remove the Iranian regime from the equation of power. Conversely, Tehran views the conflict through a remarkably similar lens, seeing it not as an attempt to constrain it, but to overthrow it. Between these competing visions, the space for compromise steadily shrinks, while the danger of broader and more destructive rounds of conflict grows. When each side believes its own survival depends upon the defeat of the other, war begins to resemble a match in which everyone seeks victory by knockout rather than on points—regardless of how long the contest lasts or how high the cost becomes.
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